This is an excerpt from my book “Right wing regime change”
The counterculture creates a style and the mobilizing myth of the right-wing. It is only in the Reconquista strategy that this force comes into its own.
The various right-wing factions and organs are held together above all by the common basic mood and type-forming aesthetics. The rational considerations and ideological principles of theory formation alone are not enough. This myth lends the main goal of the right-wing camp its appeal, which extends beyond right-wing socio-cultural milieus. Parallel to rational theorizing, the counterculture has an “emotional identity-creating” effect on the right-wing camp. Its external impact on society through fashion, music, literature, language etc. is also not based on arguments, but on “emotional conviction”. It thus attacks the ruling ideology in a way that is largely denied to the party, the counter-public and the movement. Above all, it is also the source of satire. The cultural hegemon, which acts as a permanently indignant and moralistic censor, is particularly easy to ridicule. Satire is one of the sharpest weapons of the counterculture.
In metapolitical pioneering work, it is therefore assigned the role of attack. The “meme war” is the domain of the digital, right-wing counterculture. In ironic swarm attacks, they slay one lumbering metapolitical dinosaur after another.
The counterculture is made up of intellectuals and creatives who are naturally reluctant to be co-opted by a party or movement. It is part of the great art of strategists to balance the tensions between these areas and to deal with the type of artist and intellectual in the right way.
For the counterculture must also act strategically in its internal and external impact and follow the principle of “connectable provocation”. The political identity paradox formulated by the American leftist Matthew Smucker is particularly important in this area. I will therefore summarize it briefly here: Right-wing activists need strong motivation to defy external pressure. The knowledge of “doing the right thing” alone is not enough in the long run. Most idealists need, consciously or unconsciously, the recognition of a group and a strong sense of belonging in return for their commitment. The more radical and exclusive a group identity is, the stronger this motivating effect is for its members. It is a well-known phenomenon: the more elitist a club, the more desirable and prestigious it is to belong to it. Belonging to such a strong group identity is often expressed through “displayable” artifacts (leather jackets from biker gangs, fraternity patches, etc.). This exclusivity and authenticity can be seen as “fuel” for idealism. The elitist feeling of belonging to an exclusive group is the basis for the individual's willingness to make sacrifices. Without it, opposition parties and movements would not be able to act. We now come to the “paradox”. The more exclusive and radical a political group identity is, the more concentrated this “idealistic fuel” is and the greater the sacrifices its members are prepared to make. This “fuel” loses its concentrated power when the group takes on too many members, loses its radical reputation and gives up its unity. The hard core quickly revolts against “dilution” and “betrayal of ideals”.
It therefore tends to be advantageous to have a strong, cohesive identity. However, exclusivity and authenticity simultaneously reduce the necessary connectivity and mass appeal. The more elitist and radical the group, the smaller its membership potential. It becomes incapable of “connectable provocation”.
But people power always needs a critical mass to be effective. Hence the paradox: idealistic activists are needed to reach the masses with actions. However, they need exclusivity and tend to lose their idealism as soon as they become suitable for the masses. The avant-garde elite of a camp instinctively defends itself against the “dilution” of its ideas and the inclusion of what it considers to be aesthetically and ideologically “unsuitable” elements. This is ultimately directed against their own mass appeal and connectivity.
This is where the counterculture comes into play.
It shapes the style of right-wing groups and must become aware of this dynamic. This is how the political identity paradox can be mastered: “bonding”, i.e. building a strong (and necessarily exclusive) group identity, must be kept in balance with “bridging”, i.e. building bridges to the masses. This is a constant challenge. If the “political identity” is softened too much and the “bridging” is exaggerated, the right-wing camp loses its aesthetic appeal.
The movement “bourgeoisifies” and suffocates in pragmatism. Idealistic core activists leave it disappointed. They often turn to subcultural, alt-right milieus, where they satisfy their identitarian needs in the radical attitude. The avant-garde disintegrates and is thus unable to fulfill its decisive leadership function.
If the “bonding” is exaggerated, the group loses its connection to the people. It wallows in its own radicalism and confuses shock value with metapolitical effectiveness. The emergence of “attention-economically” effective but metapolitically worthless ideological and strategic fetishes thus becomes unavoidable in the long term. The avant-garde thus remains a small, possibly highly motivated, but completely worthless cell for the reconquista. Socially isolated and attractive to unstable sociopaths, it becomes an easy target for infiltration and the “strategy of tension”.
The young avant-garde elite therefore needs to empathize with the “people”, even in its concrete, often unflattering manifestation as “right-wing boomers”. Likewise, the bourgeois right must show respect for right-wing youth and counterculture and understand their need for a certain elitist “exclusivity”.